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In my last blog post, I discussed the constraints facing the EU in 
negotiations over Brexit and concluded by expressing concern that 
the UK government has failed to adequately understand the domestic 
constraints faced by the EU. Similarly, as the Salzburg summit 
demonstrated, EU leaders at times misread the political situation in 
the UK and underestimate the challenges facing a government that is 
as deeply divided as the country at large. As such, whilst there now 
appears to be renewed optimism[1], the risk of a ‘no-deal’ outcome 
remains significant in spite of the fact that it is in neither side’s 
interest. 
As such, this article seeks to explore in a little more depth exactly 
what such a scenario might involve and the challenges it poses. To 
begin with, the phrase “no deal” is something of a misnomer. As both 
its opponents and supporters alike are keen to observe, the EU has 
become deeply embedded in a huge number of areas of British law 
and society. Firstly, it is important to keep a clear distinction between 
the so-called “withdrawal agreement” and what the UK government 
has rather euphemistically named the “future partnership”. Since the 
end of 2017, when the EU deemed that “sufficient progress” had been 
made vis-à-vis the former, talks have dealt with both concurrently. The 
withdrawal agreement (sometimes referred to in the press as the 
“divorce”) is the document that is designed to allow an orderly 
withdrawal from the EU. It is this that Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 
refers to with its 2-year timetable. 
In the UK’s case, this involves settling 3 main issues: 
1. The rights and responsibilities of UK citizens living in Europe 
and EU citizens living in the UK after 29th March 2018. 
2. The financial settlement of outstanding liabilities (related to 
financial obligations the UK has undertaken as an EU member, 
including its share of pension liabilities of past and current staff). 
3. The Northern Irish border (where the EU and UK both want to 
maintain “frictionless” trade and avoid any physical infrastructure 
on the border). 
Additionally, the UK and EU have agreed a so-called “transition” or 
“implementation” period to last until the end of the current multiannual 
financial framework (31st December 2020). During this period, the UK 
would remain a de facto member of the EU (i.e. it would continue to a 
be a member of all EU agencies, part of the Single Market and inside 
the European Union Customs Union), subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice of the EU but without any voting rights on the 
European Council. Similarly, it would lose all its MEPs and thus have 
no voice in the European Parliament. Such a transition period is 
contingent upon successful completion and ratification of the 
withdrawal agreement. 
If a withdrawal agreement is not signed and ratified by 11pm on 
29th March 2019 (the date when the UK ceases to be a member of the 
EU de jure) then the UK will immediately become a third country vis-à-
vis the EU. This is a problem precisely because the UK’s membership 
of the EU encompasses a vast range of issues that fundamentally 
relate to many areas of the UK’s national life. 
All countries in the EU are members of a number of EU agencies 
including the European Aviation Safety Agency, the European 
Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency, Euratom (which 
deals with nuclear safety) and others. It is possible for a non-EU 
country to be a member of some of these (Switzerland, for example, is 
a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency) but it would 
require negotiation and agreement, particularly if the UK is not part of 
the European Economic Area. This is highly unlikely in the absence of 
a withdrawal agreement. As such, the UK would, overnight, cease to 
be a member of any of the above agencies. This would have huge 
implications for aviation (where parts manufactured in the UK would 
all need to be re-certified). It would have major ramifications for the 
ability to carry out even relatively routine aircraft maintenance in the 
UK. A multi-billion pound industry would, overnight, struggle to 
function. 
The same would be true for the European Chemicals Agency, which 
deals with a frankly bewildering array of chemical compounds. This 
would affect diverse industries such as vehicle manufacture (for which 
hydraulic fluids, adhesives, anti-corrosion coatings, sealants and 
paints area all regulated), aircraft manufacture (for which highly 
specialist coatings are a particular concern) and many others. If the 
UK ceases to be a member of the European Chemicals Agency 
overnight then UK companies that are currently certified as REACH 
compliant would lose their rights to be able to sell into the EEA (31 
countries). The automotive industry is heavily affected by REACH and 
loss of continuity in this regard could pose challenges[2]. 
The same is true, naturally, of pharmaceuticals with regard the EU 
Medicines Agency. None of this touches upon the challenges 
associated with haulage, customs barriers (and the need to prove 
correct payment of customs duties, including rules of origin 
compliance) and the need to prove that the goods in question adhere 
to EU regulation. On the services side, much has been said about the 
loss of passporting rights for financial services firms but less has been 
said about the legal products that often go alongside this (some of 
which might also be affected by the end of passporting). Similar 
difficulties apply with regard the leaving of the digital single market 
and end of the audio-visual media services directive (as discussed in 
a previous blog post here). 
What will be the post-Brexit rules on cross-border haulage services? 
This will need to be agreed: at present, providing hauliers have the 
correct licenses they can effectively treat the EU as a single country. 
Post-Brexit this will not automatically be the case. Indeed, it is difficult 
to see how this will be done without some form of freedom of 
movement for drivers. Can such issues be overcome? Undoubtedly. 
Is the political will there? Probably. Nevertheless, it will require 
political agreement on yet another issue. The same is true for flights: 
no sensible person wants to ground flights and there is no sensible 
reason why the UK should not maintain a far-reaching “open skies” 
deal with the EU. Nevertheless, this requires proactive action: such an 
agreement needs to be drafted and signed. More generally, the UK 
needs to ensure that it has bilateral open skies agreements with non-
EU countries. At present, it has some 111 of these. A further 17, 
however, are provided by virtue of its EU membership and will need to 
be renegotiated[3]. These include important flying partners like the 
USA, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Morocco and several 
others. 
The upshot is that talk of “a deal” or “no deal” is a complete misnomer. 
There are a large number of issues that need to be worked through 
and many agreements that need to be signed. Moreover, even in the 
event that a withdrawal agreement is signed and ratified, the UK will 
only have a further 21 months before it faces the same challenges all 
over again. Ultimately, an orderly withdrawal from the EU is not the 
work of a moment (or even a year) but is likely to take a significant 
length of time. The lesson is that even when there is a huge amount 
of goodwill and desire for success, there remains much work to be 
done. 
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